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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY

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33

Government
and Politics

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS

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LIBYA

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Government and Politics

A. Introduction (S)

The young officers who led the coup that toppled the monarchy in September 1969, dramatically changed the course of Libyan politics. Libya had been ruled by King Idris since 1951, when the United Nations created an independent nation out of what had been an Italian colony. Idris ruled as a virtually absolute monarch, and his administration was discriminatory and corrupt, even by Middle East standards. Under Idris, Libya held itself aloof from the Arab-Israeli struggle and kept open close ties with the United States and the United Kingdom.

The nationalistic army officers who ousted Idris have turned things around, both at home and abroad. The government is still authoritarian, but a different group is in power; the 11 remaining army officers of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), headed by the fiery President Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, clearly the strongman of the government. The council has eliminated all traces of the monarchy and its tribally based administration. It has suppressed opposition from old regime sympathizers and dissident tribal groups, and established a vigorous security apparatus that monitors the activities of opponents, both real and imagined. Individuals favored under the preceding administration have been scattered into exile, imprisoned, or have dropped judiciously out of sight. President Qadhafi and the RCC appear to be in firm control. The Libyan President makes most policy decisions and continually harangues the population into doing things his way. He has an uphill struggle against Libyan apathy, but his tilts at such enemies as "western imperialism" and his number one enemy, Israel, are popular.

It is clearly a government in which ideology counts. Qadhafi has launched a "cultural revolution" designed to rid Libya of foreign ideologies and restore a fundamentalist version of Islam. He claims to have given power "back to the people" by authorizing the setting up of "popular committees" in most governmental and cultural institutions, public utilities, and private companies. These committees, which can make recommendations for dismissals and

promotions, have been under the council's control, and the gesture appears to have been made partly for propaganda reasons—to promote Qadhafi's cultural revolution and undercut domestic critics of his policies. One of the tasks of the committees is to root out subversives—Marxists, Communists, and "the arrogant and educated classes"; it is these groups that have been most critical of Qadhafi's pet project, a merger with Egypt.

In actual fact the government has been unwilling to permit partisan politics or public participation to interfere with its policies, and the country's sole political party, the Libyan Arab Socialist Union, is little more than a civil arm of the council. The council is careful to maintain its direct ties with the military, which is still vital to its security. Although the military does not intervene directly in affairs of state, some key officers—particularly those who participated in the 1969 coup—still have some influence with their fellow officers on the council. The council is also bolstered by the presence of Egyptian garrisons in Libya—tangible evidence of Cairo's support for the Qadhafi government.

Qadhafi's scheme for a reformed and modernized Libya initially borrowed heavily from Egyptian President Nasir's socialism, a rather vague formula for a classless society grounded in Islamic principles. (Nasir has been Qadhafi's idol since his early youth.) To this end the government Arabized schools, social institutions, and many private concerns, and established a legal code based almost exclusively on strict Islamic law. It eliminated most of the corruption that existed under the old regime and, particularly in the last 2 years, has begun to channel a substantial portion of its massive oil revenues into economic development and social welfare. The problems of distributing wealth more equitably in a country that until 1957 had an economy based entirely on primitive agriculture are, however, enormous.

Over the past 4 years, the Libyan "revolution" has picked up a momentum all its own and bears more and more the stamp of Qadhafi's impetuous and visionary personality. Qadhafi has a more religious view of the world than Nasir; he believes that Islamic

principles should be central to all aspects of society and that it is his duty to restore Arab self-respect and unite the Arab people. Qadhafi's highly personal Islamic crusade has strong political ramifications. Believing that union with Egypt will give him greater leverage in his campaign against Israel, he sees the merger as a first critical step in the battle to restore Palestine and achieve an Arab solution to Middle East questions. Qadhafi also needs Egyptian manpower and expertise to carry out his ambitious economic development plans.

The merger with Egypt probably presents more problems than it solves. Most Libyans feel that they have little to gain except Egypt's enormous debts and poverty. The average Libyan fears that he will be swallowed up by the Egyptians and is alarmed at the prospect of a massive immigration from Egypt. There are already about 150,000 Egyptians in Libya and the union issue has exacerbated the traditional animosity between the two peoples. The union has also created discord with Libya's collective leadership. Some council members have strong reservations about formal ties with Egypt, and all of them are worried about their status in a joint Libyan-Egyptian power structure. Qadhafi has stated that Egyptian President Anwar Sadat will be President of the merged countries, but that all "power would be in the hands of the people." Through this device, or through the force of his ideas and personality, the Libyan leader may believe that he can come to dominate Sadat, whom he regards as an unworthy successor to Nasir.

Backed by its vast oil wealth, Libya has become an ever more active player in Middle East politics. Qadhafi is uncompromising in his attitude toward Israel and has carried his campaign against Tel Aviv into Black Africa, Latin America, and the Persian Gulf. The fedayeen, however, are viewed by Qadhafi as the single most effective and reliable instrument against the Israelis, and Fatah as well as other terrorist organizations have received generous financial assistance and unqualified moral support from the Libyan regime.

Qadhafi's devotion to the Palestinian cause, coupled with his suspicion of other Arab leaders, were the primary reasons Libya did not become actively involved in the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. Qadhafi viewed the war as a risky military venture waged solely for the political and territorial gains of Cairo and Damascus rather than for the restoration of historic Palestine to the Arabs. Qadhafi had long suspected that both Egypt and Syria would eventually forsake the Palestinians in an effort to regain their own territory lost in the 1967 war and with the outbreak of

fighting in October 1973 Qadhafi believed that his worst fear would ultimately be realized. Although Libya dutifully threw its considerable financial and material support behind the Arab armies, Qadhafi openly denounced Egypt's handling of the war and bitterly decried President Sadat's acceptance of the cease-fire accord. For Qadhafi, the recognition of Israel, however, indirect, and the prospect of a negotiated settlement sponsored by the great powers are anathema, for which he holds other Arab leaders immediately responsible.

Qadhafi's rejection of the 1973 war and the Arab motivations which he believed inspired it accounts for Libya's half-hearted implementation of the Arab oil embargo against the United States and the Netherlands and of the oil supply sanctions against Europe and Japan. Qadhafi has long been an outspoken proponent of using Arab oil as a political weapon in the Middle East struggle; nevertheless, he apparently views the October embargo as a venture which would only hasten a settlement with Israel.

On the world stage, the Libyan President is bothered by the detente in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, for he fears that the superpowers may make a deal to divide up the world at the expense of the small non-aligned countries. Qadhafi therefore supports the organization of the nonaligned countries to stand up to the superpowers, both of whom he views as imperialist.

Tripoli's inability to strike at Israel directly has made Qadhafi increasingly antagonistic toward the United States, which he sees as a hostile force completely aligned with Israel. For some time Qadhafi has tried to promote concerted Arab pressure on U.S. economic interests as a way of changing Washington's policies, but Arab oil producers have been reluctant to go along with him. Qadhafi has threatened to take unilateral action, such as cutting off oil exports to the West. He is aware, however, that his oil income of over \$1.6 billion a year gives him clout in Arab politics, particularly with Egypt and is unlikely to move precipitously.

Qadhafi is also cool toward Communist regimes, which he views as dangerous subversive forces. Suspicious of Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, he has turned down Soviet offers of military training. Qadhafi criticized Egypt's reliance on the U.S.S.R. and probably encouraged Cairo's break with Moscow by word and wallet. He has denounced Iraq's conclusion of a friendship treaty with the Soviets, and Libyan media regularly criticize Communist states, particularly those like the U.S.S.R., with significant Muslim minorities. Libya nonetheless continues to purchase large amounts of Soviet military equipment.

The prospects for Libya under Qadhafi are for more of the same. If union with Egypt becomes something more than a paper reality, however, Qadhafi's personal vulnerabilities may become more acute as his volatile, inexperienced, and uncompromising outlook is pitted against the realities of Egyptian power and a wary Egyptian leadership.

B. Structure and functioning of the government (C)

1. Constitutional system

The Libyan Government is a constitutional republic whose central government consists of a Revolutionary Command Council and a cabinet. Regional and local governments consist of districts, subdistricts, and municipalities. The government structure (Figure 1) is a unitary system under which the central government controls regional and local governments through determination of policies, appointment of personnel, and allocation of funds.

The locus of power rests with the 11 military members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). The 1969 provisional constitution ratified the RCC's absolute power in policy formulation, and legislative and executive functions. Moreover, Article 18 of that constitution authorized the RCC to take whatever measures it deemed necessary to safeguard the revolution and the regime. As RCC Chairman, Col. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi is de facto President of Libya and is referred to as President. Qadhafi has thus far dominated politics, although other RCC members do play a significant role in policy formulation and implementation.

Libyan governmental institutions have been modified in preparation for the merger of Libya and Egypt, but how much practical impact their merger will have is difficult to determine. The joint Libyan-Egyptian merger study committees established by the August 1972 Benghazi Unity Declaration were given a broad mandate to study and develop proposals concerning such basic issues as constitutional affairs, political organizations, judicial affairs, virtually all aspects of governmental administration, and the merging of the two economic systems.

The provisional constitution of the Libyan Arab Republic was promulgated on 11 December 1969. The constitution is a formal description of the system of government which came into being following the army coup in September 1969, and thus the constitutional prescriptions and the actual system are not too far apart.

The constitution describes Libya as a free democratic Arab republic whose people are part of the Arab nation, and are desirous of comprehensive Arab unity. Islam is the state religion, and Arabic, the official language. The constitution makes no provision for democratic popular elective representation in the government, and the few rights of private citizens that are delineated are subject to circumscription by law. The constitution broadly describes the goals of the state to include the achievement of socialism through social justice, the creation of a system of comprehensive economic, social, and cultural planning, and the attainment of affluence and the peaceful elimination of class distinctions through sufficient production and the just distribution of wealth. The Revolutionary Command Council is established as the supreme authority in the Libyan Arab Republic, with legislative and policy formulating functions. RCC decisions are final, and not subject to review by any other governmental or judicial institution. The constitution makes no mention of the formal head of state, but in practice the chief executive has been RCC Chairman Qadhafi, although the Prime Minister, and other RCC members, may undertake some of the formal and ceremonial functions. Executive succession, likewise, is not dealt with, nor does the constitution define the composition, membership, and the methods of internal operation of the RCC. The RCC appoints a Prime Minister and a cabinet whose functions are to implement RCC policies and laws through the administration of various ministries and through the submission of draft legislation to the RCC. The constitution maintained the existing judicial system and delineated certain individual judicial rights of the accused such as the presumption of innocence until proved guilty, the right to a defense, and a prohibition against mental or physical torture.

2. Central government

a. The Revolutionary Command Council

The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) is the collegial ruling body of the Libyan Arab Republic. RCC members were drawn from among the Free Officers Union, the group of army officers led by Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi that carried out the September 1969 coup. It is not known if the RCC existed as a formal leadership body of the Free Officers Union prior to the coup, or if Qadhafi created it after the coup by selecting his most trusted officers to serve on it. At any rate, the existence of the RCC was apparent very shortly after the coup, although a public announcement identifying its original 12




FIGURE 1. Structure of government, executive and consultative elements (U/OU)

members was not made until January 1970. Qadhafi has been RCC Chairman from the very start, and RCC membership has been unchanged except for one member who died in August 1972 and has not been replaced (Figure 2).

The December 1969 provisional constitution ratified the absolute power of the RCC in policy formulation, and in legislative and executive functions. Moreover, Article 18 of the constitution grants the RCC carte blanche authority to take whatever measures it deems necessary to safeguard the revolution and the regime. RCC meetings are held frequently and in secret, with no formal minutes taken. Meetings are usually held at Azizia Barracks outside of Tripoli, where Qadhafi maintains his office.

The mechanics of RCC meetings, such as how agendas are drawn up, disagreements resolved, decisions reached, or even the number of members required for a quorum, are not known. It is certain that disagreements among RCC members do occur at these meetings, and RCC discussions are generally open and sometimes heated. Qadhafi is apparently willing to listen to divergent viewpoints of other RCC members but, on issues about which he feels strongly, he invariably gets his way, especially if he threatens to resign. The other RCC members realize full well that Qadhafi is the binding force of the RCC and the regime, partly because of the Nasir-like veneration he is held in by other RCC members, his popular public image, and his ties to the military levels of power via

the Free Officers Union. Once an RCC decision has been reached, it is issued as a law, decree, or policy statement through the public communications media, to be followed later by publication in the Libyan Official Gazette.

The RCC's controlling power is further expanded by the wide-ranging positions held by individual RCC members in other government institutions like the cabinet, councils such as the Supreme Guidance Council or the Supreme Planning Council, the Popular Resistance (militia), the military, and others. Participation by individual RCC members in essentially civilian administrative positions has been a point of contention among RCC members throughout the years. On the one hand, the army, which played a minor role during the Idris regime, was very distrustful of the civilian bureaucrats. Only the military, especially RCC members, had "pure motives" which would insure more efficient administration of government programs. On the other hand, Qadhafi has asserted that RCC members assumed such administrative duties only with the greatest reluctance, considering them to be "sacrifices." Qadhafi has claimed that the RCC members only wanted to be "good soldiers," although presumably they could have performed a policy-formulating function through the RCC while remaining aloof from routine government operations. The question may not have been fully resolved when the first cabinet, which did not contain any RCC members, was announced. When the two military members of that first cabinet were accused of plotting a coup against the RCC in December 1969, Qadhafi promptly took over their cabinet portfolios himself, and the RCC has been involved in government administration from then to the present time.

Ever since taking power in September 1969, the RCC has been besieged by mundane administrative problems either passed along to them by civil servants unwilling or afraid to make decisions, or directly from citizens. Currently, some of the positions previously held by RCC members, especially in the cabinet, have been reverting to civil servants. This may indicate that the RCC has developed a greater confidence in the ability of civil servants to carry out RCC policies.

The status of the RCC in a fully merged Libyan-Egyptian state is uncertain. Certainly there would likely be a diminution in the power of individual RCC members. Whether the RCC as a formal body would continue in existence is also open to question, and there have been rumors that Qadhafi would dissolve the RCC and replace it with a smaller sovereignty council that would merge more easily into the

government of a unified state. Some RCC covert de facto control in such a state might be maintained if Qadhafi carries out a rumored plan to dismiss all officers in the Free Officers Union from the army and place them in civil service positions.

b. The cabinet

The constitution charges the cabinet with implementing RCC laws and policies, and with studying and submitting draft legislation to the RCC. Although the cabinet serves at the pleasure of the RCC, individual cabinet members are constitutionally responsible to the Prime Minister. Whether the Prime Minister's power over individual cabinet ministers extends to the right of dismissing them is not clear, although he can dissolve the entire cabinet by personally resigning. In practice the problem has never arisen since the RCC has taken the responsibility of dismissing cabinet members, and the Prime Minister had always been Qadhafi (with the exception of the first cabinet) until July 1972 when Major 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, also an RCC member, was named Prime Minister. The constitution provides for joint RCC-cabinet meetings at the request of the RCC chairman or two cabinet members, and such meetings are occasionally held. The routine mechanics of cabinet meetings such as the frequency of meetings, the manner in which agendas are drawn up and decisions reached, and the size of the cabinet have evolved through practice.

Once in power, the Qadhafi regime reduced the number of ministries and has experimented with various organizational arrangements since then. In the September 1969 cabinet, which consisted of 13 ministries contrasted to 24 under the monarchy, RCC members stayed in the background, while 2 other military officers and several civilians held ministerial responsibility. From December 1969 on the RCC members felt obliged to hold a significant number of ministerial posts. Subsequent cabinets included an increased number of ministries.

A major reorganization of the cabinet was announced in July 1972 and it was noteworthy in several respects. For the first time RCC members held only the key ministries of Interior and Defense, plus the Prime Minister's position. Qadhafi apparently retained his portfolio as Minister of Defense (although the position was not specifically announced), but relinquished the Prime Minister's position, which he had held since January 1970, to the number-two man in the RCC, Jallud. Jallud probably is the most adept administrator among the RCC members; and, reflecting this, he has put together a cabinet composed



Col. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi, Chairman of the RCC and de facto President of Libya



Maj. 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, Prime Minister




Maj. 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Tahir al-Huni, Director of General Intelligence



Lt. Col. Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir, Armed Forces Chief of Staff



Maj. Mustafa al-Kharrubi, Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff, Chairman, Libyan Arab Socialist Union, de facto administrator of Cyrenaica region



Maj. Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi, Minister of Interior

FIGURE 2. Members of the Revolutionary Command Council (C)



Capt. 'Umar 'Abdallah al-Muhayshi, Public Prosecutor



Maj. Bashir Hawwadi, Secretary General of Libyan Arab Socialist Union, President of People's Court



Maj. 'Awad 'Ali Hamza, Director, Central Administrative Control Department



Maj. Muhammad Najm



Maj. Mukhtar al-Qarawi

of young, well-trained, and technically competent individuals.¹ Why Qadhafi chose that particular time to give up his position as Prime Minister is unclear, but it followed rumors of a severe rift within the ranks of the RCC. A major reason for Qadhafi's giving up the post, and one cited by him, was his displeasure at being immersed in the routine operations of government, which denied him the time to concentrate on significant policy questions, especially that of merger with Egypt.

¹For a current listing of key government officials, consult *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments*, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

The gradual increase in the number of ministries in the cabinet, along with a multitude of reorganizations, dissolutions, and recombinations of various government organizations, reflects past RCC disenchantment with the poor performance of civil servants. Qadhafi has publicly castigated civil servants for their inertia and obsession with personal pecuniary matters, and several times his irritation has reached the point where he has threatened to resign. Qadhafi's irritation with the bureaucracy has driven him to take such unorthodox measures as posing as a common citizen to check on the performance of civil servants or removing all the chairs from the offices of employees in a ministry in an attempt to prod them into more lively,

if not more efficient, performance of their duties. Qadhafi's traditional Islamic ethics and his energetic and impatient revolutionary fervor to implement programs have collided with a bureaucracy that still reflects many vestiges of the previous regime.

During the monarchy the civil service was plagued by inefficiency, incompetence, and corruption. Libya suffered from a lack of competent indigenous manpower to staff government organizations, and the problem grew more acute once oil revenues began to be used for economic development and demand for trained administrators increased. The bureaucracy reflected the political and social environment in which it existed: tribal and kinship relationships were determinants of success, not the competent performance of duties. Moreover, the pay of the civil service was low compared with the private sector, a factor encouraging graft and corruption.

The 1969 army coup paralyzed the bureaucracy. Not only did the coup threaten the traditional processes, but initially there were no RCC policy guidelines for civil servants to follow. Inertia and unwillingness to make decisions on the part of civil servants resulted in a grinding slowdown of the bureaucracy as even petty matters were referred to the RCC for decision. The RCC has tried to counter the bureaucratic deficiencies by such means as increasing the salaries of civil servants, strictly prohibiting corruption, recruiting Egyptians and other foreigners to staff government organizations, reorganizing government organizations, creating new policy and supervisory institutions like the Supreme Planning Council and the Central Administrative Control Department, dismissing, forcibly retiring, or encouraging voluntary retirement of senior civil servants, and publicly exhorting civil servants to adopt a revolutionary spirit. Whether these measures succeed in reviving the moribund bureaucracy remains to be seen, but the problems will grow more acute as Libya pursues its twofold programs of expanding, and of replacing non-Arabs with Libyans and other Arabs. Qadhafi has expressed confidence that once merger with Egypt is realized, the more experienced Egyptians will be able to solve the problem of finding sufficient numbers of trained administrators.

3. Regional and local government

The military regime has not radically altered the structure of regional and local government that it inherited from the monarchy, although the RCC immediately dismissed the incumbent provincial governors and replaced them with senior district officers. There are 10 provinces (*muhafazat*) each run

by a governor who is assisted by a provincial council where members continue to be appointed. Subordinate to the provincial governments are 32 districts (*mutasarrifiyat*) each governed by a district commissioner (*mutasarrif*). The districts have 179 subdistricts (*mudiriyyat*) with each one being governed by a subdistrict commissioner (*mudir*). Also subordinate to the provincial government are the municipalities, each of which is governed by a mayor and a municipal council. A comprehensive basic law for local government was issued in late May 1970, and in accordance with this law, province, district, and subdistrict boundaries were redrawn in July 1970 and revised the following December. The stated aim of the new law was to destroy tribal influences in the previous system of local government, plus instituting administrative efficiency through decentralization.

A Supreme Local Administration Council was established in November 1970 with the task of implementing the system enunciated in the basic local government law. Council duties include the overall coordination of policies relating to local government, supervising the transfer of administrative jurisdiction from various ministries to the provincial councils, and coordinating local projects and budgets with the national development plan and budget. The Council chairman is the Minister of Interior. Other members are those ministers heading ministries whose activities bring them within the purview of provincial and municipal councils.

The governor, who is appointed by the RCC, is the executive of the province and is responsible for security and well being in his province. From an administrative viewpoint, he is the nominal superior of the civil servants who work for the operating ministries within the province. His police powers include the right to take necessary action to insure civil order in cases of tribal dispute regarding ownership of land or wells until competent authorities can render a judgment. The governor is assisted by a provincial council composed, according to the 1970 local government law, of the following members: those who are elected by a then unspecified "popular organization" and appointed by the Minister of Interior on recommendation of the "popular organization"; officials of the "popular organization" who are selected by the organization in consultation with the governor, and members of those ministries that are involved in provincial matters, for example, Health, Treasury, and Housing. The law directs that elective members shall constitute the majority. Under the transitional provisions of the law, the Minister of Interior appoints such councils until a "popular organization" is

formed. In practice, this has been the manner in which members of the provincial councils have been chosen, although now that the Libyan Arab Socialist Union has been created as the "popular organization" it is possible that elective members will begin to appear on these councils. Duties of the provincial council consist of supervising the implementation of local plans and coordinating those plans with the national development plan. The council also approves the budget for the province, comments on the national development plan, and insures and helps plan for local services such as water, sanitation, and transport.

District commissioners are directly subordinate to the provincial governor and perform duties as directed by the governor. These duties apparently are primarily of an administrative nature. Subordinate to the district commissioners are subdistrict commissioners who, likewise, perform those duties assigned to them by the governor. Assisting the subdistrict commissioners are local chiefs (mukhtars). The duties of mukhtars were set out in a separate law issued in September 1970. In an attempt to eliminate past tribal influence in the selection of mukhtars, the law states that applicants for the post will be given a competitive examination administered before a committee formed by decision of the provincial governor. The appointment is made by the province governor on the basis of this examination. A mukhtar's term of office is 4 years, provided he does not violate any laws. Mukhtars register births, report crimes, issue identification certificates, and maintain a "charge sheet" which records all matters brought before him. The mukhtar cannot travel out of his locality without the prior permission of the district commissioner; this provision appears to be directed at decreasing the role of nomadic or seminomadic tribal leaders.

Within urban areas, government power rests with mayors and municipal councils. Municipal councils are composed of members selected from among those directly elected to the "popular organization" in whose area the municipality is located. The number of members is determined by the national cabinet on recommendation of the Minister of Interior. These members are appointed by the Minister of Interior on recommendation of the "popular organization" which has consulted with the provincial governor. The final group of council members are ex-officio members drawn from ministries whose work is involved in the municipality. Elective members shall constitute the majority of the council. The mayor is the president of the municipal council and he is appointed by the national cabinet on recommendation of the Minister of Interior. The supervision of day-to-day local services such as the registering of births and deaths,

transport, sanitation, and burial of the dead are among the duties of the municipal council. The council can raise a local guard, similar to officers of the court, for implementing its decisions.

On the provincial and municipal levels, but not on the district and subdistrict, the responsible governments can raise their own revenues through various taxes, license fees, and proceeds from utilities, although in some cases, the approval by the Minister of the Interior is required. Funding for the economic development plan is made by the central government through the various ministries.

The creation of the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (LASU) in 1971 eliminated uncertainty in the local government basic law about the "popular organization." To date, it appears that while provincial councils have been established, no LASU members serve on them. On the municipal level, mayors have been appointed by the national cabinet, but the composition of municipal councils, if they even exist, is not known.

4. Judicial system

The military regime has retained the structure of the judicial system that existed under the monarchy (Figure 3), and it appears that in ordinary matters the system has functioned pretty much as it had earlier. Qadhafi has shown an interest in ensuring that justice be dispensed promptly and fairly, and has also declared that the system must conform to a greater degree with Islamic jurisprudence. A contradictory trend has been the establishment of a special People's Court for trying enemies of the regime.

The Supreme Court is the highest court of the land. The lower court system consists of courts of appeal, courts of first instance, and summary courts; jurisdiction extends to all matters of civil and criminal law. In addition to these courts there is a parallel structure for Sharia (Muslim) courts which form an integral part of the judicial system. Presumably, informally constituted tribal courts still function, at least in remote areas of Libya, but they are not part of this system. Tribal courts may have become less important with the implementation of the 1970 local government basic law, which gives power to the Province Governor to act in cases of tribal dispute over non-registered land or wells to insure public security until "a judgment is issued by the competent authorities," presumably meaning a decision reached in the normal judicial system. Further, tribal disputes have been alleviated, in theory at least, by the February 1971 law which transferred tribal titles to land and wells to the state.




FIGURE 3. Structure of judicial system (U/OU)

Courts of appeal normally hear appeals against judgments rendered in courts of first instance. However, when sitting as courts of assize, they have original jurisdiction in serious criminal cases involving offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. They usually have three members when they are sitting as courts of appeal and five members when sitting as courts of assize. The courts of first instance, which usually have one judge, exercise original jurisdiction in most civil and criminal cases and hear appeals from the summary courts. The summary courts come within the organizational structure of the courts of first instance. They sit at various localities within the area of jurisdiction of the courts of first instance and have original jurisdiction in minor civil cases.

Tribal sheikhs exercise jurisdiction over aspects of life controlled by tribal law and custom such as distribution of lands among tribal members, settlement of disputes among tribesmen over water and grazing rights, and even intertribal and intratribal

killings, though perhaps less so at present than in the past.

Sharia courts have jurisdiction in matters of personal status (marriage, divorce, and inheritance) involving Muslims. Courts of appeal exist for cases not settled in the courts of first instance. The highest officials of the Sharia judicial system are the Grand Mufti and the Deputy Mufti.

RCC displeasure with the performance of the judicial system became evident by early 1971, when Qadhafi met with judges, public prosecutors, and Ministry of Justice officials to discuss citizen complaints about delays in litigation. Part of the problem has stemmed from the lack of competent indigenous legal talent. The RCC has relied very much, as did the monarchy, on foreign, especially Egyptian, personnel to staff Ministry of Justice and judicial positions. In late 1971 the RCC created the Supreme Council for Judicial Institutions, replacing the Supreme Judicial Council. The function of the new council is to supervise and coordinate all facets of the judicial system, and to express opinions on all matters concerning legal institutions. Chairman of the council is the RCC Chairman, with the Minister of Justice being the Deputy Chairman. Other members include the President of the Supreme Court and the Public Prosecutor.

During the monarchy the Supreme Court was directly responsible to the King and it exercised jurisdiction over cases involving constitutionality. It also provided advisory opinions to various officials on questions concerning draft laws. Under the current regime the power of the Supreme Court has diminished since the constitution specifically states that RCC laws are not subject to judicial review. The extent to which the cabinet and various ministry officials seek Supreme Court advisory opinions concerning draft legislation is not known. In November 1972 a Libyan was named a President of the seven member Supreme Court, replacing an Egyptian who had held the post since 1969.

In December 1969 the RCC announced the formation of a special People's Court that would try those individuals who had been implicated in plotting "treachery, treason, and the undermining of the revolution," meaning the two military members of the cabinet who had been accused of plotting a coup against the RCC. Another law was issued at the same time that outlined crimes against the state that would be prosecuted before the People's Court. Death was decreed as the punishment for armed opposition against the regime, while imprisonment awaited those who spread provocative propaganda, caused class hatred and dissension, disseminated political or economic rumors, or demonstrated against the regime.

The People's Court has been used to try old regime officials held for crimes they had allegedly committed during the monarchy, as well as journalists who had been accused of "crimes against the state." People's Court verdicts are not subject to appeal, although the RCC apparently does ratify them. In at least one case, the RCC ordered that defendants be retried because the sentences they had been given by the court were considered too light. The People's Court is not subject to regular judicial procedures. The public response to People's Court trials has been marked by boredom and disinterest, despite the fact that they are publicized and televised.

The RCC has the power to commute sentences and grant amnesties or pardons, and it has reduced sentences on a large scale on anniversaries of the 1969 coup.

A major anomalous trend in the Libyan judicial system, when it is compared with the development of judicial systems in other Arab states, has been Qadhafi's insistence that Libyan jurisprudence conform to a greater degree with Islamic law. This has resulted in such laws as that which requires compulsory payment of the traditionally voluntary alms tax (*zakat*). In a more bizarre vein, Qadhafi announced in October 1972 that Libya would begin to apply the old Islamic penalties for thievery and armed robbery which consist of the amputation of the right hand or the left foot. He did concede to modern sensibilities by saying that such penalties would be carried out by qualified surgeons in hospitals, with the victim under anesthesia. Since these types of penalties have yet to be carried out, Qadhafi might have announced them merely to dramatize his intent to "Islamicize" Libyan law.

Despite the constitutional injunction that Libyan judges are independent and shall make their rulings guided only by law and conscience, the RCC holds very powerful controls over the judiciary. Its right to appoint and dismiss judges, establish special courts, issue decrees (such as the one concerning crimes against the state) that can be very broadly interpreted, and the ability to influence judicial organization and policy through the Supreme Council for Judicial Institutions gives it great de facto powers in the judicial sector, if it chooses to exercise them.

C. Political dynamics (S)

Since its overthrow of King Idris in September 1969, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) has wielded near dictatorial power in Libya. Backed by the army and two Egyptian garrisons based in Libya since 1969, the RCC has successfully fragmented

opposition from old regime sympathizers and it has encountered no other serious opposition to its rule. President Qadhafi, whose primacy on the council is frequently affirmed by the 10 other members, is the key figure binding the junta together. Qadhafi's personal style of leadership overshadows that of any potential rival and has been an important stabilizing influence during the regime's 4 years in power.

1. The RCC's rule

Members of the RCC began to plan their route to power during the early 1960's when they formed a secret Free Officers organization while attending the Royal Military Academy at Benghazi.² Although the exact size of this clandestine organization has never been established, it was widely believed that about 70 Free Officers actually planned and executed the overthrow of the monarchy. The membership of the RCC was deliberately kept secret for several months after the coup probably to cover up internal maneuverings among the Free Officers. However, since its formal announcement in December 1969, the composition of the ruling junta has been unchanged except for the death of one member who was killed in a car accident in 1972. The stability of the membership is one clear indication of the RCC's predominance over its parent Free Officers organization and of the strength of the fraternal bonds which have developed among the 11 men during their years in power.

Initially, the RCC attempted to govern behind a facade of civilian rule, but the young officers—distrustful of civilian politicians—soon took over direct control of all key ministries. Although administrative authority has gradually been turned back to civilian officials, the council carefully monitors their activities and is quick to check any opposition to its policies. More importantly, RCC members continue to exercise tight control over the administration of the defense establishment and security services.

Qadhafi and his colleagues have been unwilling to brook any opposition of any sort, and the country's sole political party, the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (LASU), is little more than an instrument for domestic propaganda. Using all the tools available to an authoritarian regime, the RCC has tried to organize a broad popular base, but so far only the younger generation within the small, politically-conscious public has responded enthusiastically to their military

²For diacritics on place names see the list of names on the map of the Summary Map in the Country Profile chapter and the map itself.

leaders. For the bulk of the Libyan people, the revolution and the LASU remains remote from the tribal ties and inward focused values which have shaped their lives for centuries.

Aware of this narrow popular following, the council has been careful to strengthen its direct links with the military, which is still vital to its security. The regime frequently pays public tribute to the Free Officers Union, which is probably the most privileged group in Libyan society. Although the organization probably does not intervene directly in affairs of state, it sometimes serves as a consultative body to the RCC particularly on those issues involving the entire defense establishment. All officers in the armed services enjoy special status and perquisites, and even the needs of the rank and file soldier are generously met. As further insurance of the military's loyalty, armed forces personnel are permitted only limited contact with foreigners in Libya and they are carefully supervised while on assignments outside the country.

Finally, Egypt's endorsement of the RCC and the very tangible support of two Egyptian garrisons stationed in Libya have served to guarantee the regime's control over the country. The Egyptian government is anxious to ensure Libya's generous financial contributions to its treasuries and to maintain some measure of political leverage over its western neighbors. Although Qadhafi's meddling in Arab politics has frequently irritated President Sadat and Nasir before him, the Libyan leader's affinity for Egypt has given them ample reason to protect his regime.

2. Qadhafi's primacy

Within the RCC, Qadhafi is the key personality and undisputed leader among his colleagues. While he does not completely monopolize power, Qadhafi is the charismatic force (Figure 4) which pushes the rest of the council from one initiative to another. He has fired the imaginations of many young people and has won at least grudging respect from some members of the older, more cautious generation. His efforts to construct in Libya a state that is modern, militarily strong, socialist and Islamic appeals to many Libyans, who acutely felt the Arab defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1967. Qadhafi's preoccupation with Arabization and his expulsion of the Italians has also struck a responsive cord in most Libyans, who have developed a deep distrust of foreigners as a result of centuries of colonial domination.

Qadhafi's unshakable belief in Islam guides almost all of his actions. He is genuinely committed to the idea that Islamic principles should explain and




FIGURE 4. Qadhafi addressing a large gathering in Tripoli (U/OU)

organize all aspects of society. More important, he believes that it is his duty to restore the Islamic religion to its rightful place in society and to unite the Arab people. For him, the existence of Israel and almost every setback to the Arab cause are attributable to human frailty, especially a default of faith and a departure from moral principles. This view is expressed in his inflexibility, xenophobia, impatience, and frequent periods of frustration and disillusionment.

The other members of the council recognize Qadhafi's personal primacy, and they undoubtedly realize that he could survive politically without them. They too are followers. They share their generation's sense of Arab humiliation and are frequently captivated by the idealism which Qadhafi dramatizes. While few if any of Qadhafi's colleagues share his sense of religious and patriotic mission, they appear to be dedicated to him personally and to most of his goals. Although alliances do shift among the 11 men depending on the issue and even though Qadhafi has not always been able to dictate to them, no real challenge to his leadership has emerged.

After Qadhafi, the pecking order in the RCC is more difficult to establish. As the regime has become more institutionalized, some members have assumed areas of authority which serve as the only real indicators of their weight within the council. Major 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, who became Prime Minister in 1972, is the regime's chief administrator and the main negotiator with other governments on the RCC's priority economic and military matters. Jallud and Major al-Huri, the longtime head of the security services, are generally considered second only to Qadhafi. Maj. Yunis Jabir, chief of staff of the armed forces, and his

deputy, Major Kharubi, maintain close daily ties with the military, and, like Qadhafi who acts as de facto defense minister, they have direct influence over the regime's primary source of power. Three other members, Majors Hawwadi and Humaydi and Captain Muhayshi, have less easily defined spheres of authority, but they have undertaken important responsibilities in domestic affairs. Majors Najm, Hamza, and Qarawi, perhaps the least forceful members of the collegium, handle a variety of duties, but they appear to take their lead on most matters from Qadhafi.

Most council members appear to value collegiality even more than individual loyalties, and alliances among them seem to shift depending on the issue in controversy. Although Qadhafi has won the council's approval on most issues, he periodically has come up against overwhelming objections to his proposals and has had to back down. The most persistent cause of tension within the council seems to center on Qadhafi's pro-Egyptian policies and his ultimate goal of forming a complete Libyan-Egyptian merger. Some members of the council apparently have serious reservations about the union scheme which they believe would eventually be dominated by Egypt, and they are well aware that much of the Libyan public shares their fears. So far, Qadhafi has been able to maintain his colleagues support on most matters involving Egypt. However, his plans for union of the two countries could prove to be a critical test of his leadership and indeed the cohesion of the collegium.

3. Other political forces

Qadhafi and his coterie of officers were greeted initially with a great deal of enthusiasm from those groups who were most strongly opposed to the monarchy—students, teachers, and young bureaucrats and professionals (Figure 5). Found for the most part in the urban middle class in Tripoli and Benghazi, these groups are part of the younger generation, many of whom were educated in other Arab countries or the West where they have been exposed to new ideas and ideologies.

Many of these young people believe that major changes must be made in Libya, and they share many of the sentiments and goals of their leaders. For example, there are varying degrees of anti-Western feelings, focused on such issues as Western friendship for Israel and identification of the United States and the United Kingdom with the conservative and repressive monarchy. Pan-Arab nationalism is strong among young people, and many revere President Nasir's efforts to restore Arab dignity in the realm of



FIGURE 5. Tripoli demonstration in favor of new RCC government, 1969 (C)

international affairs. Among this younger generation, the regime's strict non-aligned policy, its radical star J toward Israel, and its tough negotiating line with Western oil companies in Libya have been extremely popular.

In the past decade, however, the growth of Libyan nationalism throughout the intelligentsia has been significant. Many advocates of this new nationalism are more concerned with national unity and Libya's own interests than with those of the greater Arab world. Although they are strongly Arab nationalist in outlook and desire to identify Libya closely with Arab causes, most Libyans want their country to assume influence in the Arab world as an independent state rather than as junior partner in a union with Egypt. Aware of the development potential that has resulted from oil revenues, they do not want to see Libyan wealth squandered on other countries or military adventures. Although this sentiment has not coalesced into any major political national movement, many Libyans are beginning to express their disapproval of the RCC's pursuit of a unified Arab state—particularly Qadhafi's proposal in August 1972 for union with Egypt. So far, opposition to the union scheme has been limited to private grumblings and some public demonstrations, particularly in Cyrenaica where anti-Egyptian sentiment is strongest. Nevertheless, the controversial policy has the potential for fostering sustained opposition to the regime, which Qadhafi can ill-afford to ignore, particularly since some members of the RCC also have reservations about closer ties with Egypt.

Some elements in the armed forces share these anti-Egyptian nationalist sentiments with the Libyan

public, but the majority of the military strongly supports the RCC and will probably continue to do so as long as they feel their own special status is not threatened by the regime's policies. The Free Officers are the key influence within the military, and they serve as the privileged phalanx insuring their subordinates cooperation with the regime. Very little information has come out about the size and organization of the Free Officers Union, whose members are sometimes referred to as Unionist Officers in keeping with their goal of Arab unity. Fewer than a dozen officers have been positively identified as members of the organization, but the number of Free Officers has probably grown in proportion with the expansion of the regular officers corps. The RCC undoubtedly realizes the difficulty of ensuring the loyalty of new officers if they were denied entry into the organization, and the ranks of those who collaborated in the 1969 coup have probably been augmented by many recently commissioned junior officers. Just how interested the Free Officers are in politics is also difficult to establish. Some apparently have a very deep commitment to Qadhafi personally and have supported him in some disputes within the council. However, the organization probably has no firm leadership and may well encompass a broad spectrum of personal alliances.

The conservative elements in Libyan society have been largely discredited by the regime and they are unlikely to regain the influence they formerly enjoyed under the monarchy. Many of the more prominent among them—particularly tribal leaders and members of aristocratic families—are in exile or detention as a result of the initial purges following the 1969 coup. Moreover, for those who have survived these purges, the threat that the regime will dredge up corruption charges against them has curbed their political activity. Much of the opposition, which the regime appears to have quelled, emanated from Cyrenaica, Idris' home region.

Despite the regime's efforts to mobilize enthusiasm for its policies among average citizens, the bulk of the Libyan public remains apathetic toward their revolutionary leaders. Although the government's efforts to administer social benefits and development programs have made some Libyans aware that the regime is concerned about their welfare, most have not developed a national consciousness and have little commitment to any national authority. The Libyan people, many of whom fear Egyptian absorption, have made known their opposition to the regime's plans for a Libyan-Egyptian merger. Their resentment so far has been expressed through discriminatory treatment of the Egyptian community in Libya rather than being directed at the RCC.

4. Political parties

Prominent individuals of influential tribes and families have long been in competition for political leadership, but political struggle has traditionally taken forms other than that of political party rivalry. Parties have no foundation in the traditional life of the Libyans and have had only a sporadic existence. The Italians banned Libyan political parties during the period of their rule between 1911 and World War II. In 1947 and 1948 the British allowed party activity only as a means for permitting Libyans to air their views on the country's future. However, these parties were banned by King Idris in 1952 following a violent episode in Libya's first elections.

From its earliest days the RCC seemed to be searching for a way to draw important segments of the population into its programs and to inspire enthusiasm for the revolution in the average Libyan. At first the military leaders' suspicion of parties and politicians apparently kept them from establishing a formal organization, and for nearly two years they relied on a series of popular rallies to promote support while maintaining the ban on organized political activity. In 1971, however, Qadhafi announced the formation of the Libyan Arab Socialist Union (LASU), which, despite official denials, is the only legal party in the country. The Ba'th Party, a pan-Arab political movement, still has some members and sympathizers in Libya, but its influence has diminished considerably because of the regime's strict surveillance and occasional harassment of anyone associated with the Ba'th Party.

a. The Libyan Arab Socialist Union

The LASU was established first and foremost to serve the regime and after some fits and starts in its early development it has become a fairly effective civil arm for the RCC. According to Qadhafi's wishes the party is modeled after the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union and its structure reflects Nasir's design for a social and political organization which links leadership with the masses.

Soon after formation of the LASU, Qadhafi made it clear that the new organization would not function as a regular political party, but would serve rather as the major instrument for applying socialist principles to the Libyan situation. The RCC carefully monitored elections of party officials even at the local level where in several instances vote-rigging caused the regime to void the results and reschedule new elections. Finally, after much fanfare the first National Congress was convened in Tripoli in March 1972 and, as expected, Qadhafi was named LASU President.

Theoretically, the National Congress, which consists of around 500 delegates, is the supreme ruling body of the party. Between sessions of the congress, its Central Committee headed by an executive council handles party affairs. There is little information on the actual workings of these party organs, but it appears that a Secretariat General headed by RCC member Hawwadi actually controls the day-to-day business and acts as the regime's controlling arm in the party structure.

Below the national organization are the 10 provincial (or governate) units, most of which are headed by RCC members. These provincial units are divided into district, and finally into basic units. These units, numbering over 2,000, are scattered throughout cities, villages, government agencies, and private enterprises. In some cases, the LASU basic units have merged with labor unions and the distinction between union and party activity has become somewhat blurred. Very little information is available on the size of the party or qualifications for membership, but some reports indicate that there were over 200,000 LASU members in late 1972. Most government employees probably feel that party membership is necessary to protect their jobs, and they most likely account for a substantial but unenthusiastic portion of the rank and file. Moreover, the LASU appears to serve as an umbrella organization which has absorbed labor, student, and other youth groups.

The RCC has tried to impart prestige and responsibility to the LASU and council members seem to take their duties quite seriously. Party activity is generally aimed at selling the regime's policies to the public through the media, popular rallies, and the party structure itself. Qadhafi has taken a particularly active part in many party programs and frequently spends a great deal of time addressing special seminars and meeting with LASU members at the local level. He has also instructed party officials to look after the needs of ordinary citizens and to help them take advantage of public health, education, and housing programs.

In addition to serving as a pipeline to the public, the LASU is an instrument with which the government demonstrates its power and authority. LASU units in the predominantly American-owned petroleum industry have demonstrated their ability to pressure the companies on such issues as Libyanization, increased pay, and general working conditions. Similarly, the orchestrated demonstrations and protests mounted from time to time by the regime depend mainly on LASU manpower, and hundreds of

party members can be turned out in fairly quick order. For example, massive demonstrations in favor of union with Egypt were staged during the unity conference between Presidents Sadat and Qadhafi in August 1972 as part of the regime's pressure campaign to draw their reticent neighbors into the merger scheme.

There has been much fanfare in Libya regarding the November 1972 announcement of the merger of the LASU with its Egyptian counterpart. Cooperation between the two parties, however, has been limited to the executive level, and very little integration is expected to take place. If the union between the two countries ever assumes real substance, the more vigorous leadership of the Egyptian ASU may well inspire an independent spirit in its Libyan partner, but mutual suspicions will undoubtedly prevent any meaningful consolidation of the two parties even at the highest echelons.

b. The Ba'th Party

The Arab Socialist Resurrection Party, commonly known as the Ba'th Party, represents a pan-Arab, socialist reform movement with international headquarters in Damascus, Syria, and regional branches in various other Arab countries. Between 1958 and 1961, when Syria and Egypt were joined in the United Arab Republic, President Nasir attempted to use regional Ba'th parties to achieve his objectives and permitted Ba'thists to operate in Cairo. With the breakup of this union in 1961, Nasir and the Ba'th Party became enemies, and now Nasir's followers work separately to create their own brand of Arab unity.

Syrian Ba'thists in 1956 helped a Libyan, 'Amir al-Tahir al-Dughayyis, to form a Ba'thist group among members of the Libyan Students Club in Cairo. Later that year, 'Abdallah Sharaf al-Din, a member of this group, returned to Libya and began forming Ba'th cells in Tripoli and Benghazi. Using the members of the Ba'th group in the Cairo Libyan Students Club as a core, the Ba'th Party expanded its organization in Libya to include secondary school students, minor government officials, and trade union officers. In 1961, however, the Libyan Government imprisoned 87 members of the party, and since then the Ba'thists have been unable to reorganize themselves successfully.

Soon after the RCC established firm control following the 1969 coup, several prominent members of the Ba'th Party made bids for positions in the new government. However, Qadhafi's vehement anti-Ba'thist sentiments quickly dashed their hopes and many members of the party either left the country or

severely curtailed their political activities. Qadhafi views the Ba'hist movement as a corrosive, atheistic influence and a serious threat to his Nasirite principles. In 1971, he expelled some 70 Palestinian Ba'thists for alleged subversion, and he has kept a close security watch on Libyan sympathizers who have remained in the country.

5. Elections

Elections are alien to Libyan traditions and the people have had little opportunity to become familiar with modern electoral practices. Under the monarchy, the only elections ever held were for deputies to the House of Representatives, and the government blatantly controlled every stage of the election process. The RCC has abolished even the facade of democratic institutions and the only elections held since 1969 have involved Libyan participation in the Confederation of Arab Republics (CAR), and the establishment of the LASU official structure.

Although the military regime has conducted elections with a minimum of direct interference, the RCC views the electoral process as a means for drumming up public enthusiasm and it has used various methods to ensure the results it wants. For example, to guarantee support for Libyan participation in the CAR, the referendum on the federation charter was conducted on 1 September 1971, the anniversary of the Libyan revolution and a day charged with emotional spirit for Arab causes. Moreover, black boxes were used as receptacles for negative votes, a ploy which played upon the strong Muslim superstition that black is evil and dangerous. Not surprisingly, the referendum was overwhelmingly accepted by a record turnout of voters.

Elections for LASU officials and for deputies to the CAR Assembly have been carried out in routine fashion. Suffrage has been extended to both males and females, but there is no information available on the age requirements for participation in either election. All candidates for LASU offices and for deputy representatives to the CAR must be registered members of the LASU, and all LASU members are required to vote. The RCC has carefully monitored each stage of these elections and has intervened on several occasions to prevent vote-rigging and to insure that all candidates meet nomination requirements. The regime has also criticized those campaign practices which play on tribal ties and family influence.

D. National policies (C)

1. Domestic

In attempting to reform Libyan society, Qadhafi is trying to cast off the psychological fetters of centuries of foreign domination and to instill a sense of national identity and pride in Libyans. He views these steps as essential in revitalizing and uniting the Arab world. Under the RCC's direction the last vestiges of the pro-Western Libyan monarchy have been eliminated; in its place the full panoply of the early regime of Egypt's Nasir—except for the People's Assembly—has been reproduced. Qadhafi's goal is to harmonize the political and economic structures of Libya and Egypt in preparation for a complete merger of the two states.

Qadhafi is aiming at a classless society marked by social justice, equal opportunity, and a more equitable distribution of income. Many schools, hospitals, child care centers and roads have been built and the welfare services expanded to a reasonable level. The corruption and patronage in the government that flourished under the monarchy has been largely ended, as has the tribally based administration; local chiefs must now take competitive exams. The government has provided subsidies for housing and education, but no money handouts in the Saudi Arabian fashion. A major problem has been in getting the welfare programs to nonurban Libyans and in helping the rural dwellers to take advantage of the services available.

To reduce foreign influence in Libya and reinstate the primacy of the Arabic language and culture, the government has Arabized schools, social institutions, and many private concerns and established a legal code based almost exclusively on strict Islamic law. English street names have been replaced with Arabic, and all travellers to Libya must carry Arabic-language passports. Although Qadhafi has made exceptions to this rule when it serves Libya's own economic and political interests, the regulation has been enforced against all nationalities, causing considerable disruption.

The government has also moved against foreigners resident in Libya. Thousands of lifelong resident Italians have been evicted and the United States and United Kingdom have evacuated their bases, at Libya's request. To be sure many Italians have returned, but they are Italians untainted by the colonial connection. All these antforeign moves have struck a responsive chord in the average Libyan.

whose mistrust of foreigners has been fed by centuries of foreign domination. Qadhafi's religious bent also fits in with the conservative values entrenched in the religious tradition of the country. There has been criticism of some of Qadhafi's measures such as banning entertainment and alcohol and not much enthusiasm among students and businessmen for his attempts to instill revolutionary fervor. This lack of response probably provoked Qadhafi to call in mid-1973 for a "cultural revolution" which would include the destruction of books containing foreign ideologies and the rooting out of "sick people"—marxists, capitalists, the bourgeois bureaucratic class, and arrogant intellectuals. Qadhafi backed up his rhetoric by arrests, mostly of leftists and members of the conservative religious Muslim Brotherhood; he also "returned power to the people" by the creation of "popular committees" to be elected in villages, schools, industry and branches of the government. The committees must be approved by the RCC and follow certain vague guidelines, but some are apparently taking matters into their own hands, creating problems, particularly in the important oil industry. Qadhafi has said that the committees, when trained, will be given arms.

In the economic field, Libya wants to increase its control over the petroleum industry and still receive the revenues and profits which are the mainstay of its most cherished domestic and foreign goals. Libya last year negotiated an increase in the price of oil and as of mid-1973 was discussing with the major oil companies operating in the country the extent and manner in which Libya would become a partner in local petroleum operations. Libya had been asking 50% participation in oil company operations while the companies were offering 25%, similar to agreements with Arab Persian Gulf states. In May 1973 Libya increased its demands to include 100% ownership of the oil companies equity by the Libyan Government. The government, however, does not appear to be prepared for a wholesale nationalization of the industry; in fact Qadhafi has said that Libya would do that only if all oil producing Arab countries did so. In the meantime, efforts are being made to develop purely Libyan oil companies.

Libya is trying to lessen its dependence on oil by diversifying the economy, building up agriculture, commerce and industry. The biggest push is in agriculture, where the government aims to make the country self-sufficient in food as soon as possible. Agriculture has been allotted \$720 million under the current 3-year development plan and as much as \$1.8 billion will be earmarked for agriculture over the next 10 years. Ambitious land reclamation projects are

planned, involving the expansion of irrigation facilities and the settlement of farmers, who will be provided with adequate housing, schools, medical care and access to markets. All ports are slated for improvement and five seawater desalinization plants are planned. A number of smaller industrial plants are being constructed. Libya has been experimenting with a mixed economy in which cooperation between the public and private sectors has been stressed. Semi-autonomous government corporations have proliferated, many of them new and inexperienced. The expansion of the public sector has been the result of the government's desire to achieve "Arab socialism" i.e., more control over the distribution of the nation's wealth and of its social, economic and political development.

In preparation for the merger a joint Libyan-Egyptian economic committee has been set up and has probably made some minor decisions on joint development goals; it is unlikely that progress has been made on such key issues as an integrated currency or direct Libyan support for development projects in Egypt. There is, however, considerable cooperation between the two countries. A number of large Egyptian companies are carrying out development projects in Libya, particularly in housing and agriculture. There are about 150,000 Egyptians in Libya, providing skills and advice to both the public and private sector.

The investment climate is poor because the government has not reconciled the conflicting goals of obtaining foreign know-how with the desire to be free of foreign influences. In addition, most foreign enterprises nationalized in the wake of the 1969 revolution have not received compensation.

Another of Libya's goals is to create a politically dependable, proficient and well-equipped military establishment. Although the armed forces have not been tested in battle, they are well-equipped, well paid, enjoy considerable social prestige, and are under tight RCC control. Their weaknesses lie in their distaste for hard physical training, lack of qualified personnel, and their inability to maintain equipment. The government takes care to insulate them from foreign influences; only the Egyptian training mission has substantial contacts with major elements of Libya's armed forces. The two Egyptian battalions in Libya are there to provide support for the Libyan revolution. The government's elaborate security services and militia complement the armed forces in the maintenance of internal security. These elements, like the single political party, the Libyan Arab Socialist Union, are directly responsible to the RCC

and represent increasingly effective tools available to the RCC in carrying out its domestic and foreign policies.

Libya faces many obstacles in achieving its domestic goals. The population of about 2.2 million, which is predominantly illiterate and unskilled, is quite inadequate for its development needs. Achieving a more equitable distribution of wealth is difficult in a country where, except for the cities, the settled population consists of nuclearized, lonely settlements separated by hundreds of miles of desolate desert; less than 11% of the population is nomadic. Despite the country's ambitious road program, large areas remain isolated. Finally, despite the government's strong desire to Libyanize the economy, it will remain for a long time dependent on foreign assistance, especially in the area of technical assistance. Libya must also contend with the torpid, overlarge bureaucracy inherited from the monarchy. The prospects for the development and diversification of the economy are also hampered by the regime's tendency to subordinate such practical goals to their reforming zeal and their ambitions to lead the Arab world.

2. Foreign

President Qadhafi is the principal architect of Libyan foreign policy, but many of his views are shared by the other members of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council. Qadhafi's foreign policy moves stem from a fundamentalist belief in Islam, and a deep conviction that it is his duty to unite the Arab people, as other Arab leaders are not doing their part. These apparently unshakable convictions explain his intractable militancy, his willingness to subordinate purely Libyan interests, and his eagerness to challenge the United States or any other power he views as blocking his visionary goal of Arab destiny.

The Libyan leader's desire to take the lead in Arab affairs is partly a reaction to centuries of foreign occupation and the low esteem other Arab countries had for Libya under the monarchy. The lightning swiftness of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967—a war in which Libya had no part—amplified the sense of shame of the young officers who pulled off the coup against the monarchy in 1969. They are determined to avenge their humiliation and redress the balance in Libya and the Arab world's favor. Under their leadership, Libya has become zealous in its pursuit of Arab unity, and the most committed of any Arab state to an armed confrontation with Israel.

Militant leaders of other Arab countries are goaded by a similar sense of humiliation to lead the Arabs in

somehow overcoming the Israelis, but are circumscribed by economic weakness. In contrast, Qadhafi and his colleagues, by the accident of massive petroleum reserves, have far more money than they can use for constructive internal projects and thus have the means to finance whatever strikes them at the moment as furthering Libyan leadership of the weak and divided Arab world. Libya has been able to purchase top quality arms for its as yet untested armed forces, to provide the major foreign subsidy to Israel's principal adversary, Egypt, to be the major trainer and paymaster for the Arab fedayeen, and also to provide money and/or arms to prospective insurgents opposed to Israeli allies—including such unlikely groups as Northern Ireland's Catholic terrorists, Black Muslims in the United States, and the Philippine Muslims. The extent of such aid to client states is probably not realized by most Libyans.

The Libyan President has an almost mystical attachment to union with Egypt, which he sees as a forerunner of the eventual union of the Arab nation; he also realizes that Libya's oil resources will probably not last much more than 20 years and that Egyptian farmers, technicians and expertise are needed for Libyan development. There are many obstacles to the union, not the least of which are the conflicting personalities of the reckless Qadhafi and the more drab, cautious Egyptian President Sadat. Anti-Egyptian sentiment in Libya is strong, and certain key military officers have threatened to withdraw their support from Qadhafi if he goes ahead with the merger. Libyans genuinely fear absorption by Egypt, which has a population of 35 million as opposed to Libya's 2 million; the presence in Libya of approximately 150,000 Egyptians has also been an irritant. Some "Libya Firsters" also fear that Qadhafi is diverting funds that could be better used at home. Libya will bring about \$3 billion in ready revenues to the union; Egypt will bring a similar amount in foreign debts, owed mostly to Communist countries.

The practical obstacles to the union are many. How can Libya's professional army of 18,000 be joined with 250,000 Egyptian conscripts who earn one-tenth as much? What will become of the relatively high average Libyan annual revenue if it is combined with the much lower Egyptian one? The merger is clearly not popular with Libyan students, who think the Egyptian regime is not revolutionary enough, the conservative merchants, nor the civil servants, who fear that their salaries will be reduced.

On the Egyptian side President Sadat is not enthusiastic, but he wants to protect his position with Qadhafi, who had been giving Egypt about \$250

million annually, until 1972, when the amount started to dwindle. Qadhafi has voiced a determination to go ahead, "even if it means civil war." Qadhafi is vulnerable on the merger, however, for it is the one policy of his that is genuinely unpopular, and his continuing advocacy of it in the face of popular opposition may prove his undoing.

a. The Maghreb

To balance his close, but frequently strained ties with Egypt, Qadhafi has from time to time turned his eyes toward Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco—with varying degrees of success. Libya's particular brand of Islamic, Nasirite Arab nationalism does not sit well with the traditionalist, Western-oriented regimes in Morocco and Tunisia.

The enmity between Qadhafi and King Hassan of Morocco is implacable and each is bent on overthrowing the other. Libya applauded the abortive coup against Hassan in August 1971 and has been providing arms and money to exiled Moroccan dissidents who have been engaged in terrorist incidents in Morocco on a small scale.

Relations between Libya and Tunisia are outwardly good, but Tunis suspects that Tripoli may be stirring up the Tunisian dissidents it harbors in Libya. Qadhafi views Tunisia as powerless and faltering while awaiting President Bourguiba's death; he expects that once Bourguiba is gone Tunisia will become more radical and thus more suitable for close association with Libya.

The pragmatic Algerian President Boumedienne is willing to give Qadhafi support in their common struggle against Israel but draws the line at toppling Hassan and has urged Qadhafi to stop sending Libyan supported Moroccan dissidents through Algeria into Morocco.

b. Other regional alignments

Other alignments have not fared well. The vaguely linked combination of Egypt, Libya, and Sudan in the 1970 "Tripoli Pact" was broken in the autumn of 1972 as Libya and Sudan took opposing sides in the bickering between Uganda and Tanzania. The fate of the Confederation of Arab Republics (CAR) grouping Libya, Egypt and Syria is also obscure. Tripoli mistrusts the Ba'athist regime in Damascus as laic, if not atheist, and prefers to hold it at arms' length; Damascus, for its part, suspects Qadhafi of stirring up trouble in Syria.

c. The struggle against Israel

In addition to an annual contribution to Egypt, which amounted in 1973 to \$59 million plus arms and equipment, Libya provides over \$100 million to the

fedayeen and to an assortment of clients for the announced purposes of furthering Muslim solidarity and the solidarity of nations and groups opposed to Israel and its supporters. Most of Qadhafi's energies and a considerable amount of Libya's budget has been consumed by activities directed at the number one enemy, Israel. Libya has given at least \$50 million in arms and supplies to the fedayeen—including Fatah's Black September Organization—over the past year and is now their main supporter. Qadhafi also provides training facilities in Libya for perhaps as many as 2,000 guerrillas, gives logistical and cash support to various fedayeen operations, and has extended documentation and asylum. Although the Libyan leader has frequently stated that terrorism should be aimed directly at Israel, his frustration with Arab inability to meet the Israeli challenge may now have led him to favor terrorist operations outside the battle area.

Qadhafi has conducted an anti-Israeli diplomatic offensive in both Africa and Latin America. Israel's setbacks in Black Africa and a growing fedayeen presence there have in part grown out of the Libyan leaders' ability to provide at least the promise if not the fact of generous financial benefits from his country's oil wealth. Qadhafi is helped by the myth of beneficence that surrounds his activities and by the desperate need most Black African countries have for financial assistance.

Even before the October 1973 war, Tel Aviv had been ousted from five African countries: Uganda, Chad, Congo, Niger, Mali, and Burundi. Qadhafi undoubtedly encouraged Ugandan President Amin, a Muslim, to break with Israel by promising him aid, although other factors were involved. No large financial package materialized, although Libya did send materiel and troops during the Ugandan exiles' invasion last fall and will open up a branch of the Bank of Libya in Kampala; the Ugandans are also buying military equipment with Libyan money.

Chad, which has a large Muslim population, broke with Israel last November. Chad's Christian president, Tombalbaye probably hoped that the move would induce Qadhafi to stop supporting the Muslim insurgency in Chad. After talks between Tombalbaye and Qadhafi in December, the Chadians claimed Qadhafi promised them substantial development funds. A Libyan military delegation has visited Chad and returned home with a sizable shopping list. So far no funds have turned up and Qadhafi continues to support the insurgents, albeit at a reduced level. Congo and Niger broke with Israel following the latter's announcement in December that it was reducing its representation to nonresident status. Niger had been receiving modest Libyan aid even before the

break with Israel and was anxious to avoid difficulties with Qadhafi. Mali—next door to Niger—followed suit on 5 January. Niger and Mali have large Muslim populations; Congo does not, but has long been pro-Arab in outlook. Mauritania—the African country that has received the most hard cash from Qadhafi—has from independence aligned itself with the Arabs. It is a safe bet that these countries were hoping for financial rewards. In the past year, however, Qadhafi has been less open-handed than formerly, and they will probably have to come up with good projects before he agrees to finance them.

Libya is a large contributor to the African Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as well as to African liberation organizations. Using the implied threat that contributions will stop, Qadhafi has tried to persuade African countries to break relations with Israel, and until Ethiopia broke relations with Israel during the 1973 Middle East war, he lobbied to have the OAU seat moved from Addis Ababa to Cairo.

d. The West

Qadhafi's urgent foreign policy concerns—Arab unity, the liberation of Palestine, the revival of Arab glory and power—demand that he confront any foreign power that he sees posing a threat to those concerns. He has not forgotten France's colonial role in sundering the Arab world (nor its current "neocolonialist" role in Chad), but Paris' largely commercial view of its relations with Libya (above all, its willingness to sell Libya over a hundred modern fighter aircraft) suits Qadhafi, who sees Paris as at least neutral in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The delivery of the aircraft (some of which Qadhafi has now transferred to Egypt in violation of his agreement with France) has been tied into economic, agricultural and technical cooperation agreements, making France the fourth largest supplier of goods and services to Libya.

Relations with the United Kingdom are cool. The United Kingdom evacuated its base at El Adem in 1970, at Libya's request, and in late 1971 Qadhafi nationalized British Petroleum (BP) in retaliation for what he claimed was U.K. complicity in Iran's seizure of three Persian Gulf islands. Qadhafi wished to preserve the Arab character of the islands and saw Iran's move as a non-Arab encroachment. Negotiations between BP and Libya concerning compensation have not yet taken place, and Qadhafi's outspoken support of the Irish Republican Army continues to be an irritant. Qadhafi's moves against the United Kingdom (and also the United States) strike a responsive chord among Libyans, whose xenophobia stems from centuries of foreign domination.

Libya views the United States as an adversary because of its support for Israel, or as Qadhafi has put it "the friend of my enemy is my enemy." Qadhafi's frustration with his inability to strike at Israel more directly has made him increasingly antagonistic toward the United States. Last year he cut back the U.S. diplomatic presence (as well as that of the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.), and he continually makes propaganda assaults against U.S. policy throughout the world.

Qadhafi has visions of getting the small, nonaligned countries to stand up to the superpowers, and it is this—as well as a desire to undercut Israel—that has led him to turn his attention to Latin America—particularly to countries that have Arab minorities. Libya has recently established relations with Panama and has announced plans to open embassies in Brazil, Chile and Argentina. Panama is reportedly attracted by Libya's oil money; any inroads the Libyans could make there at the expense of the United States would not displease Qadhafi. Libya has also reportedly been financing covert action and propaganda activities in Latin America.

e. The U.S.S.R.

Qadhafi's deep religious convictions are the basis of his dislike of "godless communism"—Marx, Lenin, and the lot. He is aware that Soviet support for the Arab cause stems from Soviet ambitions in the area and seems sincerely convinced that the superpowers, all of whom he views as imperialist, may make a deal to divide up the world at the expense of the smaller, nonaligned nations. Qadhafi condemned Egypt's past reliance on the U.S.S.R. and undoubtedly encouraged Sadat's break with Moscow. His anti-communism takes the form of broadside attacks against the U.S.S.R. and other East European states as well as attacks on Communist parties in the Arab world. Nonetheless Qadhafi continues to do business with Moscow while castigating it. In the past 2 years Libya has purchased \$118 million worth of arms from the U.S.S.R.

Libya has been cool to Peking, which it views as atheistic but not an imperialist threat, partly because of its great distance. Tripoli recognized Peking when it was admitted to the United Nations, but it has not established relations or exchanged diplomats. The Libyans continue to have good relations with Taiwan, which has an embassy in Tripoli. It appears likely that if a real Libyan-Egyptian merger takes shape, the new entity will establish relations with Peking and end ties with the Nationalist Chinese.

Libya attaches little importance to its membership in the United Nations, an organization which Tripoli

believes is completely dominated by the superpowers. Although President Qadhafi apparently still believes that the U.N. General Assembly is a useful propaganda platform for the smaller, nonaligned countries, he views the veto-power of the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council as one more example of "imperialist" control over the international community. The voting of Libyan delegates in U.N. bodies almost always reflects Tripoli's Arab interests and its strict policy of nonalignment. Libya has consistently supported the nationalistic aspirations of peoples in dependent or colonial areas and has taken the side of the Afro-Asian nations as opposed to Western powers. Although Libya participates in most of the specialized agencies affiliated with the United Nations, Qadhafi has little faith in the ability of the international community to solve important issues. He vehemently opposes a negotiated settlement of the Middle East dispute and has repeatedly condemned U.N. efforts to deal with Arab-Israel differences.

E. Threats to government stability (S)

1. Discontent and dissidence

During its 4 years in power, the RCC has had to deal with a variety of malcontents and scattered cases of political intrigue, but so far the regime has not been seriously threatened. The government enjoys the passive support of the inward-looking Libyan population, which—with only few exceptions—has shown little inclination for risk-taking political activism. There is no evidence of organized subversion among those groups that have a capability to challenge the government. Such discontent as exists is generated primarily by dissatisfaction with specific policies rather than generalized anti-regime sentiment.

a. Residual regionalism

The most bitter critics of the regime are found among conservative elements in Cyrenaica, particularly wealthy families, tribal leaders, and former officials of the Idrisid monarchy. Under the old regime, these groups had considerable authority and prominence, but since the 1969 coup they have lost their influence and to a lesser extent their prestige. They deeply resent what they see as the government's lipservice to republican principles, its reckless policies, and dictatorial control. More important, they fear the RCC's campaign to discredit anyone suspected of corruption and other crimes committed during the monarchy. Many businessmen, prominent public figures, and former politicians—many of them from

Cyrenaica—have been totally discredited by the government. Others are under detention and the roundup of suspected offenders still goes on.

Although the RCC has tried not to exacerbate tribal sentiment and has scrupulously avoided the politics of regionalism, many Cyrenaicans interpret the regime's campaign against those associated with the monarchy as discrimination against them.

This regional allegiance—although on the wane—is still a worrisome problem for the RCC. Periodically, clandestine groups suspected of being based in the eastern province have circulated anti-regime tracts, but there is no evidence that such groups amount to much more than small, poorly-organized collections of dissidents. No legally constituted organizations in Cyrenaica could effectively challenge the regime. The RCC has dismantled the once powerful Cyrenaican Defense Force—the principal prop for King Idris; most, if not all, of the senior officers have been retired and junior officers have been integrated into regular army units and the urban police force. There is no evidence that these elements have agitated tribal rivalries or generated any serious tension within the armed forces. Nevertheless, should other problems threaten the cohesion of the military, the Cyrenaicans could be expected to follow regional objectives.

b. Political complaints

Many middle class Libyans are discontented with their prospects under the regime. Although many businessmen, professionals, and bureaucrats are sympathetic to the regime's support for Arab causes, they resent Qadhafi's subordination of domestic interests to Pan-Arab goals. They are particularly alarmed at what they see as the squandering of Libyan money on other Arabs' interests.

Many sophisticated Libyans are frustrated by the limited scope of permissible political activity and their total inability to influence Qadhafi and his colleagues. Some have simply ignored RCC policies, while others have more openly criticized their leaders. Qadhafi's cultural revolution inaugurated in April 1973 has been directed at silencing these critics.

Under the auspices of the cultural revolution, nearly 2,000 "popular committees" have been unleashed in a campaign to intimidate and discredit the regime's detractors throughout the small, educated middle class. Many professionals, bureaucrats, and other prominent public figures have had their homes and offices rifled by police and "popular committee" members in search of what Qadhafi calls subversive literature and other evidence of foreign influences. Some have been temporarily dismissed from their

positions on the pretext that their qualifications must be reviewed. Such police-state tactics have deeply alienated many Libyans. Those who have been hardest hit by such action are in no position to threaten the regime; nevertheless, they could well become a core of outright opposition to the government.

c. Anti-Egyptian sentiment

The most volatile issue in Libya is President Qadhafi's pro-Egyptian policies. Relations with Egypt have been problematic since Libya gained independence in 1951. Strong cultural and historical ties bind the two countries together and many Libyans view Egypt as the natural leader of the Arab world. During King Idris' reign, most of the younger generation of Libyans resented Libya's separation from the contemporary Arab world and they looked to Egypt as the spokesman of their Arab nationalist sentiments. Initially, they supported the RCC's close cooperation with the Egyptian leadership and its identification with Nasir's stand in Arab politics. The bulk of the Libyan people, however, have long distrusted their large and powerful neighbor and have resented Egypt's long record of interference in Libya's domestic affairs. Moreover, as the politically sophisticated segment of the population has developed a keener sense of Libyan nationalism, many have lost their initial enthusiasm for closer ties between the two countries.

The government's importation of many Egyptian advisers, technicians, skilled workers, and military personnel has been the most immediate cause of complaints. Most Libyans deeply resent working with Egyptians, who are frequently better trained than their Libyan counterparts. Moreover, the possibility that Egypt's large surplus of educated professionals and skilled and common workers will continue to flow into Libyan cities has increased the Libyans' apprehensions that their jobs will eventually be jeopardized. Another major source of irritation has been Qadhafi's financial commitments to Cairo. Libyans are not quite certain how much of their country's wealth is being funnelled into the flagging Egyptian economy, but most disapprove.

For the most part Libyans have vented their frustrations directly on their Egyptian co-workers. As ill-will has continued to mount, however, many have begun to openly criticize the regime. Qadhafi's scheme for a union between the two countries has been privately denounced by the vast majority of Libyans whose strong feelings on the issue erupted into violent demonstrations in early 1973. Since then, most

people have resigned themselves to what they probably see as the inevitable drift toward a much closer alliance with their neighbors. Nevertheless, their anti-Egyptian sentiments will remain—periodically erupting into open clashes with the Egyptian community in Libya—and perhaps fostering a situation in which budding oppositions feel they can marshal a common cause to use against the regime.


2. Subversion

From time to time, a handful of Libyan exiles who fled the country following the 1969 coup have tried to muster foreign support for a counter-coup against the Qadhafi regime. Most of the exiled dissidents are former officials of the Idrisid monarchy who escaped to various European and Arab capitals during the purges that followed the demise of the monarchy. Although they probably remain in touch with one another, these individuals appear to represent little more than a disorganized and dispirited collection of malcontents. They have had no real success in their efforts to gain backing for their cause and have—at least temporarily—stopped lobbying in those Arab capitals which presumably would be sympathetic to their hopes to unseat the RCC. Omar Shalhi, the most colorful member of the exile group, is the most committed to the overthrow of the Libyan Government. Despite his persistent efforts, however, Shalhi has never been able to attract more than moral encouragement from Qadhafi's detractors in Morocco, the primary haven for the exiles. Moreover, he has little support in Libya beyond his imprisoned brother and some other followers.

Soviet intelligence activities have been detected in Libya, but these and other Communist intrigues have been sharply curtailed since 1969. There is some doubt as to whether a Communist party formally exists in the country at all. It is more likely that Libyan Communist activity is confined to a very small group of individuals who identify with Communist causes and are sympathetic to its principles.


For the first few years following the coup, Qadhafi did not translate his strong anti-Communist sentiment into much more than public denunciations of communism and periodic but essentially harmless harassment of suspected sympathizers. This environment, however, no doubt convinced any of those associated with Communist activities that they could no longer safely stay in Libya. Although the regime has still not launched a serious campaign against them, many of those suspected of having Communist leanings have been arrested since the advent of the cultural revolution in mid-1973. The government

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Chronology (u/ou)

1580

Ottoman control is extended throughout country but is only nominal or partial in some areas.

1835

Second Ottoman occupation of Libya begins, following period when the governing authorities had been virtually autonomous.

1911

Italy occupies Libya.

1943

January

The United Kingdom and France assume control of Libya after defeat of the Axis powers in North Africa.

1947

February

Italy signs peace treaty renouncing claim to Italian territorial possessions in Africa.

Allied powers fail to agree on the ultimate disposition of Libya; question is referred to the U.N. General Assembly.

1949

November

General Assembly recommends independence no later than January 1952.

1950

December

Idris, Emir of Cyrenaica, is proclaimed King of Libya.

1951

December

Libya becomes an independent state.

1952

February

First national elections are held.

1953

March

Libya joins the Arab League.

July

Libya signs 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with the United Kingdom.

1954

October

U.S.-Libyan base rights agreement goes into effect.

1955

September

Diplomatic relations are established with the Soviet Union.

1957

June

Oil discovered in commercial quantities.

Military assistance agreement is signed with the United States.

1963

April

A royal proclamation announces the abolition of the federal system in Libya and the establishment of a unitary state.

May

Libya becomes a member of the Organization of African Unity.

1967

June

Riots protest failure to aid other Arabs in war with Israel.

August-September

Libya attends Khartoum summit conference and pledges \$84 million annually to compensate Egypt and Jordan for losses suffered during the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

1969

September

The monarchy is overthrown by a group of young officers in a bloodless coup, and the Libyan Arab Republic is established.

December

United States and United Kingdom agree to evacuate military bases.

1970

January

France announces agreement to sell Libya over 100 Mirage aircraft.

March

United Kingdom evacuates Tobruk and El Adem bases.

June

United States evacuates Wheelus Air Base.

July

Qadhafi announces discovery of another plot, involving retired police officers and old regime political figures, allegedly aided by United States.

September

Death of Egyptian President Nasir makes Qadhafi most important inspirational leader of radical Arabs.

SECRET

1971
April

Libya negotiates agreement on petroleum.

Formation of Confederation of Arab Republics—Libya, U.A.R., and Syria—is announced. Tripartite union exists only on paper.

June

Formation of the Libyan Arab Socialist Union, patterned on Egypt's only political party, is announced.

July

Qadhafi's support enables Sudanese President Numayri to regain power, after being briefly ousted by Sudanese Communists.

Qadhafi's expression of support for Moroccan air force officers who unsuccessfully attempted to kill King Hassan precipitates suspension of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

1972
August

Libya and Egypt agree to full merger by September 1973.

1973
February

Libyan airliner is shot down by Israel over Sinai.

March

Libya attacks U.S. aircraft flying over Mediterranean near the Libyan border.

April

President Qadhafi initiates a "cultural revolution" and calls for the formation of "popular committees" with the authority to run the country's private and public institutions.

June

President Qadhafi announces the nationalization of U.S.-owned Bunker Hunt Petroleum Company.

July

40,000 Libyans participate in a "March on Cairo" to demonstrate popular support for union with Egypt.

October

In the war with Israel, Libya calls the Egyptian and Syrian aims of regaining their territory insufficient and decries acceptance of the cease-fire accord.

Glossary (u/ou)

ABBREVIATION	ARABIC	ENGLISH
CAR.....	<i>Ittihad al-Jumhuriyat al-'Arabiyyah</i> ...	Confederation of Arab Republics
CYDEF.....	<i>Al-Quwwat al-Mudafa'ah al-Barqah</i>	Cyrenaican Defense Force
GI.....	<i>Mukhabarat al-'Ammah</i>	General Intelligence
GID.....	<i>Idara al-Mabahithah al-'Ammah</i>	General Investigations Directorate
LASU.....	<i>Ittihad al-Istarakiyah al-'Arabiyyah Libiyah</i>	Libyan Arab Socialist Union
OAU.....	Organization of African Unity
RCC.....	<i>Majlis Qiyadat al-Thawrah</i>	Revolutionary Command Council
...	<i>Al-Munazzamah al-Muqawamah al-Sha'biyyah</i>	Popular Resistance Organization

SECRET

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